— Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation, 1896
The Fundamental Principles of a Pure Theory of Public Finance
I wish I could link to this article for you guys to see it. I haven’t been able to find a PDF of it and I don’t have the time to type it all out. Maybe I’ll scan my copy. This is a great read though. It’s a Positive Theory of the State
An entire community consists the political enterprise and participates in it:
Is the [political] entrepreneur the community, and must the hedonistic calculation derive from the community itself? The entrepreneur produces coercive force. This force of coercion is applied to the maintenance of the community in certain forms, to the achievement of certain aims and ideals, to the collective satisfaction of certain needs. The form, the aims and the needs of the community are not under discussion. It is certain, however, that if they were identical for all associates, the action of the political entrepreneur would be redundant; coercion would cease and all political organization would disappear. The continued existence of the State means that coercion is necessary in order to make the needs of a majority to prevail. The hedonistic calculation appertains only to part of the community, namely the majority. However, given the hypothesis of general participation of all the members of the community in the political enterprise, coercion assumes a milder form; it takes the form of contribution quotas and not of tax. A further struggle develops with regard to the determination and distribution of the contribution. The individual’s readiness to vote for the expenses of coercion will vary according to the size of the contribution. The expenses of coercion cause collective action always to be more costly than individual or independent associated action. It may nevertheless happen that, despite these expenses, the maximum size of the corporation, which comprises the entire community, proves more economical. But we already know that the greatest total productivity of collective production is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine collective action; the expenses of coercion must also be taken into account*. The whole question lies then in the proportions in which a particular need is felt by the members of the community, and in the possibility of distributing the contributions in unequal fashion[, to decrease the real cost through cost sharing being tied to marginal utility of economic units].
Coercion consists in obliging all the associates in the enterprise to contribute toward a particular purpose, for example, water supply. Let us make the broadest hypothesis and postulate that it is a question of achieving a purpose or of satisfying a need, that is of a general nature. The enterprise levies a contribution from all the members of the community. Let us further suppose that the contribution quota is equal for all members. The objective economic expression of the advantages of collectivizing the production of a good, will be the price at which the consumer can buy a given product. This price, whether it is paid before the service is performed or at the moment of consumption must be lower than the price previously ruling on the market. For example, water previously cost twenty pence per cubic metre and now, with collective production, it costs ten pence per cubic metre. All the associates should agree on this collective production, which proves less costly for all. But this is not a sufficient reason to induce all of them to collectivize production, and indeed we see bitter discussion and opposition against assuming certain types of collective production which are manifestly of a general character and more economical. What are the reasons for this?
In the case of equal contribution by all members, as in the case of prices paid at the moment of consumption, the reasons must be sought in the fact that, at the moment of deciding what needs are to be satisfied collectively, not all the associates can agree on the preference to be accorded to one rather than to another need. The process is as follows. All individuals have before them a more economical way of satisfying their own needs, this being the coercion which will distribute the costs of the whole community. According to the urgency of his own need and the greater or lesser ease with which he can satisfy them in isolation, everyone will try to make that need prevail, the collective satisfaction of which will afford him the greatest advantage. Any collective production which fulfils [sic] the condition of the greatest economy and which yields products of general consumption, could with advantage be accepted by all the associates. But they think in terms not of the isolated differential utility of a single productive act, but of the relative utility of all the possible types of production that could be collectivized. For conflicts to be avoided, the political entrepreneur’s power of coercion would have to be infinite and limitless; but it is certain that this power too is, at every moment, finite in extent and efficacy.
There are other cases when collective production yields the most economical product, the contributions on the part of the individual associates being unequal. Then the political struggle against the sanctioning of collectivization becomes unavoidable and obvious. It may, for example, be said: water is a good of general consumption which can be obtained collectively at a lower cost, but in order to obtain it let us raise existing tax rates proportionally. If the existing system is already unequal, this means that the inequality will be accentuated and that the economic calculation will differ for the various economic units according to whether they are favoured by the tax system or not.
Hence here, too, the calculation of advantages entails not merely a comparison of different total costs or prices, but a more complex comparison of the various associates’ relative utilities.
In conclusion: even when the political entrepreneur represents the entire community, the very fact that the entrepreneur functions means that the community needs a service of coercion in order to distribute the costs. This means that the calculations of economic advantage differ from one associate to another when it comes to determining the needs to be satisfied collectively. The collectivization of the satisfaction of some needs always aims at a participation in the costs by economic units which would not voluntarily have so participated.
—Giovanni Montemartini, The Fundamental Principles of a Pure Theory of Public Finance (Gionale degli economisti, 1900)
I really enjoyed this.
My friends,
In the last week or two, I have heard frequently from you that the current financial mess has been caused by the failures of free markets and deregulation. I have heard from you that the lust after profits, any profits, that is central to free markets is at the core of our problems. And I have heard from you that only significant government intervention into financial markets can cure these problems, perhaps once and for all. I ask of you for the next few minutes to, in the words of Oliver Cromwell, consider that you may be mistaken. Consider that both the diagnosis and the cure might be equally mistaken.
Consider instead that the problems of this mess were caused by the very kinds of government regulation that you now propose. Consider instead that effects of the profit motive that you decry depend upon the incentives that institutions, regulations, and policies create, which in this case led profit-seekers to do great damage. Consider instead that the regulations that may have been the cause were supported by, as they have often been throughout US history, the very firms being regulated, mostly because they worked to said firms’ benefit, even as they screwed the rest of us. Consider all of this as you ask for more of the same in the name of fixing the problem. And finally, consider why you would ever imagine that those with wealth and power wouldn’t rig a new regulatory process in their favor.
—Steve Horwitz
[W]hy not talk about how regulations and licensing laws restrict the liberty of average citizens to live out their dreams in meaningful ways? Running one’s own business is not just “economic behavior.” It is part of what the philosopher Loren Lomasky means when he talks about how liberty enables us to be “project builders,” creating meaning in our lives. For many, especially members of groups that historically have been deprived of such opportunity, creating and running a business is a source of immense pride and accomplishment, inseparable from the broader goals of one’s life. We should focus on the importance of that liberty, not just the damage done by the State.
We might also talk about the ways in which businesses in freer markets effectively serve their consumers rather than meeting the preferences of politicians and regulators. By providing consumers with more variety, higher quality, and lower prices, businesses in more competitive, less regulated markets make it that much easier for their customers to create and execute their life projects. The liberty that producers gain when government lets them alone enables the rest of us to exercise our liberty in powerful and meaningful ways. Simply shifting our rhetoric from the negatives of the State to the positives of liberty might persuade people that we, rather than just being complainers, have a vision of a better society.
Foucault and Anarchism
Ch. 1 Anarchism From Foucault to Ranciere (PDF)
With reading Dr. Todd May on the subject-matter and rereading Foucault’s theories of Disciplinary Power and repression’s effects on society’s sexuality I’m pretty certain you can more easily see Foucault’s anarchist tendencies alongside his “libertarian” undertones.
Indeed—and Foucault had much stronger libertarian elements in his thought that, in fact explicitly so in some places regarding limited government and free markets and, of course, anti-statism. A Nietzschean philosophy professor discusses Foucault’s classical liberal elements here, also here is a typical take on Foucault’s libertarian elements from a prominent (lew rockwell) libertarian perspective, and here is a Critical Review article analyzing Foucault’s later-life ‘hyper-liberalism’ and ‘libertarian politics.’
Um, are you serious? Like, is this a joke? Have you ever read a word of Foucault?
(Source: maozedongisnotcool)
An educated young man likes to think; he likes ideas for their own sake and likes to deal with them disinterestedly and objectively. He will find this taste an expensive one, much beyond his means, because the society around him is thoroughly indisposed towards anything of the kind. It is preeminently a society, as John Stuart Mill said, in which the test of a great mind is agreeing in the opinions of small minds. In any department of American life this is indeed the only final test; and this fact is in turn a fair measure of the extent to which our society is inimical to thought. The president of Columbia University is reported in the press as having said the other day that “thinking is one of the most unpopular amusements of the human race. Men hate it largely because they can not do it. They hate it because if they enter upon it as a vocation or avocation it is likely to interfere with what they are doing.” This is an interesting admission for the president of Columbia to make - interesting and striking. Circumstances have enabled our society to get along rather prosperously, though by no means creditably, without thought and without regard for thought, proceeding merely by a series of improvisations; hence it has always instinctively resented thought, as likely to interfere with what it was doing. Therefore, the young person who has cultivated the ability to think and the taste for thinking is at a decided disadvantage, for this resentment is now stronger and more heavily concentrated than it ever was.
—Albert J. Nock
The modern corporation is a legal entity chartered by the State. Corporations benefit from an arsenal of privileges, such as personhood and limited liability, which serve to set the rules of the market on terms favorable to corporate investors and managers. The trend has always been to correct any perceived problems with big business by large, top-down regulation, rather than to reexamine the quite blatant decisions made long ago about how to treat these entities.
For instance, it is conceivable that a firm could argue effectively in front of a judge for certain of the rights of being a human citizen on a case by case basis, but current established law mandates a clumsy legal equivalence between living human beings and abstract organizations of people and assets (which is historically dubious). The benefit to big business, of course, is to regularize and simply business legal proceedings, setting aside the legal advantages this gives corporations over individual humans. The ability to exercise first and fourth amendment rights as if the firm were a human being results in corporate campaign contributions and protection from random inspections, for instance – very different from the way those rights were intended to be invoked by the founders.
Obviously, limited liability is a fiat subsidy to corporate investors, the value of which is vast when one calculates the total capitalized value of the stock market, for instance. But the utility of the subsidy goes even further, because it allows investors to hire managers who have a legal mandate to pursue profits while maintaining a distance from the way profits are pursued. Highly capitalized firms, who by their sheer size wield far more potential for harm than any single individual, essentially obfuscate the way decisions are made so that if third parties to the stockholder-manager relationship are harmed, stockholders cannot lose more than their investment.
The imbalance of responsibility this enables cannot be underestimated, for it goes to the very heart of corporate economic behavior. What would be different about business, socioeconomics, and politics if stockholders knew that their managers’ activities would leave them fully liable for the actions of the corporation and could lose their savings, their car, their house? Limited liability and corporate personhood make possible a way of doing business in a far riskier way than normal people would.
In a free market, corporations would not be able to rely on the State for their very existence. Any ability they’d have to do business as an entity would come from the consent and cooperation of the market – customers, suppliers, contractors, service providers, banks, but most importantly management. Without an SEC and intrusive reporting requirements, oversight, and regulatory enforcement, it would be very hard to prevent the larger and more complex firms from being subjected to outright fraud in a variety of ways. The legal relationships that govern so much capital finance and business activity would become much more ad hoc and less predictable. Risk would skyrocket, which is a much more favorable environment for the small-time entrepreneur than the big, clumsy, bureaucratic corporation.
—Jeremy Weiland
[Y]outh is the incarnation of reason pitted against the rigidity of tradition; youth puts the remorseless questions to everything that is old and established—Why? What is this thing good for? And when it gets the mumbled, evasive answers of the defenders it applies its own fresh, clean spirit of reason to institutions, customs and ideas and finding them stupid, inane or poisonous, turns instinctively to overthrow them and build in their place the things with which its visions teem …
Youth is the leaven that keeps all these questioning, testing attitudes fermenting in the world. If it were not for this troublesome activity of youth, with its hatred of sophisms and glosses, its insistence on things as they are, society would die from sheer decay. It is the policy of the older generation as it gets adjusted to the world to hide away the unpleasant things where it can, or preserve a conspiracy of silence and an elaborate pretense that they do not exist. But meanwhile the sores go on festering just the same. Youth is the drastic antiseptic … It drags skeletons from closets and insists that they be explained. No wonder the older generation fears and distrusts the younger. Youth is the avenging Nemesis on its trail …
Our elders are always optimistic in their views of the present, pessimistic in their views of the future; youth is pessimistic toward the present and gloriously hopeful for the future. And it is this hope which is the lever of progress—one might say, the only lever of progress …
The secret of life is then that this fine youthful spirit shall never be lost. Out of the turbulence of youth should come this fine precipitate—a sane, strong, aggressive spirit of daring and doing. It must be a flexible, growing spirit, with a hospitality to new ideas and a keen insight into experience. To keep one’s reactions warm and true is to have found the secret of perpetual youth, and perpetual youth is salvation.
—Randolph Bourne
(Source: mises.org)
Here’s the next article on my list. I’m really enjoying these Hayek pieces, I must confess.
It would not be easy to defend macroeconomists against the charge that for 40 or 50 years they have investigated competition primarily under assumptions which, if they were actually true, would make competition completely useless and uninteresting. If anyone actually knew everything that economic theory designated as “data,” competition would indeed be a highly wasteful method of securing adjustment to these facts. Hence it is also not surprising that some authors have concluded that we can either completely renounce the market, or that its outcomes are to be considered at most a first step toward creating a social product that we can then manipulate, correct, or redistribute in any way we please. Others, who apparently have taken their notion of competition exclusively from modern textbooks, have concluded that such competition does not exist at all.
By contrast, it is useful to recall that wherever we make use of competition, this can only be justified by our not knowing the essential circumstances that determine the behavior of the competitors. In sporting events, examinations, the awarding of government contracts, or the bestowal of prizes for poems, not to mention science, it would be patently absurd to sponsor a contest if we knew in advance who the winner would be. Therefore, as the title of this lecture suggests, I wish now to consider competition systematically as a procedure for discovering facts which, if the procedure did not exist, would remain unknown or at least would not be used.
—
F. A. Hayek, p. 76
[EDIT: This is such an amazing article, btw. I never knew I would enjoy Hayek this much.]
— F. A. Hayek, p. 61
—

Becoming An Anarchist
Philosophical Arguments:
- Why I Am An Anarchist by Benjamin Tucker
- Against The State by Crispin Sartwell
- Anatomy of the State by Murray Rothbard (PDF)
- Our Enemy, The State by Albert J. Nock (PDF)
- Reflections on the Origin and the Stability of the State by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
These are just a few off the top of my head. I’m sure there are many other very influential writings to read. I just haven’t gotten to reading them yet. Also, I haven’t read much by the traditional anarchists. But I’m more focused these days on learning more about the practicability of anarchism than the philosophical or ethical arguments for it.
